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Abstract: This research explores rival firms’ optimal strategies when engaging in market competition. 
We assume that customer demand is subject to customer sensitivity to the competitors’ price and service 
levels. First, we develop coopetition models under a symmetric case where there is identical service-
investment efficiency between two firms. We then extend our analysis to an asymmetric case in which 
the two firms have different service-investment efficiencies. Our results show that the optimal strategic 
decisions regarding whether to compete or cooperate and how to cooperate depend on the intensity of 
the market competition in which the firms are engaged. The results also indicate that coopetition changes 
the dynamics of the competition and cooperation between the rival firms. More specifically, on the one 
hand, coopetition eases competition intensity in the cooperating area, for example, price or service; on 
the other hand, it increases competition intensity in the non-cooperating area. Decision frameworks are 
proposed that enable firms to make optimal strategic decisions on coopetition under various market 
conditions.  
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Despite increasing levels of service competition in many industries, there has also been a paradigm shift 
from competition to coopetition. While some companies have set up their own service strategies to 
compete with rivals, others have decided to cooperate with rival firms to improve their competitive 
advantages. For instance, among online retailers, some have invested in distribution and logistics 
operations to provide their own delivery services, whereas others have chosen delivery services provided 
by other firms, such as Amazon, while still competing with each other for customer demand (Chen et al. 
2016). Hisense and Haier, despite being main market rivals in the household appliance sector in China 
for many years, have recently cooperated to establish after-sales service stores that serve customers of 
both firms in order to reduce their after-sales service costs. In the iron ore industry, three mining giants—
Rio Tinto, Vale, and BHP Billiton—often cooperate together to influence the iron ore price of the market. 
In the airline industry, many airlines have formed strategic alliances, agreeing to cooperate at a 
substantial level and making collaborative decisions, for example, on service provision, resource 
allocation, and pricing (Chen and Hao 2013). Although competing firms engage in cooperation at 
different levels, this kind of strategic behavior is becoming more popular across a variety of industries, 
such as the mobile communications, automobile, and high-tech sectors. 
This strategic behavior is known as coopetition, a phenomenon defined as the simultaneous pursuit 
of cooperation and competition by firms (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Dowling et al. 1996; 
Bengtsson and Kock 2000; Gnyawali et al. 2006; Chen 2008). Since the seminal work by d’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988) on cooperative and non-cooperative research and development (R&D), the 
concept has attracted growing interest among practitioners and academics. The existing literature argues 
that coopetition is the most advantageous relationship between competitors (Bengtsson and Kock 2000) 
and firms can achieve superior performance and gain economic benefits by deriving valuable resources 
from their coopetitive relationships and from strengthening their competitive capabilities (Lado et al. 
1997; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001; Gnyawali et al. 2006; Gnyawali and Park 2009). In the retail 
setting, legitimate competitive behavior is rewarded by support from other actors in the market, with 
clear domains for cooperation and competition (Varman and Costa 2009). 
While there are some obvious benefits to cooperating on service provision, it is not clear how such 
cooperation affects the nature of competition, as these firms are competing for consumer demand at the 
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same time. Coopetition can also be a risky relationship that is detrimental to cooperation effectiveness 
and can result in failure (Park and Russo 1996; Kim and Parkhe 2009; Ritala 2012). The success of a 
coopetition strategy is not only significantly influenced by the relationship between the coopetition 
entities and firm-specific factors, but also by the embedded economic and market context (Ritala 2012). 
This may explain why coopetition strategies are often adopted in highly dynamic and competitive 
markets. Furthermore, in the high-tech industry, which is characterized by short product life cycles, rapid 
technical advancement, high R&D expenses, and fierce competition, these pressures, as well as the need 
for technology standards, drive many technology firms to collaborate with their fiercest competitors. 
However, the simultaneous pursuit of competition and cooperation may also change the nature of 
competition (or cooperation) and the dynamics of coopetition between firms. The changing environment 
and firms’ enhanced capabilities and competitiveness achieved through coopetition may also force them 
to reevaluate their coopetition strategies. 
Although coopetition has become a heated topic, both in practice and in research, there are some 
important questions that still demand clear answers. Observations from the academic literature and real-
world examples motivated us to explore the important issues of coopetition and contribute to the 
progress of coopetition research. The focus of our study is, therefore, on a firm’s optimal coopetition 
strategy and on the market environments in which such a strategy is successful. In particular, we 
investigate the following questions: 
• Does coopetition on service provisioning generate superior financial performance? 
• What is the best strategy for a firm engaging in coopetition?  
• How does market competition affect a firm’s strategic decision around coopetition, and 
conversely, how does coopetition impact the nature of market competition? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the dynamics of coopetition and the effects of coopetition 
strategies on firms’ operational decisions and financial performance. To this end, we consider two firms 
at the same level in the value chain competing with each other by selling substitutable products to end 
customers in a market. Due to the dynamic and competitive market environment, firms must compete 
with more sophisticated strategies, rather than by simply lowering prices. Some of the non-price factors, 
such as service, have become more important in affecting a consumer’s purchase decision (Iyer 1998; 
Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Bernstein and Federgruen 2004). The service here represents all forms of 
demand-promotion effort, which include sales promotion; customer service before and after the sale, 
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such as maintenance and warranty repair agreements (Cohen and Whang 1997; Xia and Gilbert 2007); 
financial services, such as loans and insurance in the automobile industry; and the overall quality of the 
shopping experience, such as delivery service, among others. Thus, in addition to price, service is a 
critical element in a firm’s operational management and marketing strategy (Xiao and Yang 2008). 
Therefore, firms have to make a strategic choice not only between competition and coopetition, but also 
regarding the business areas that they choose for cooperation. It can be a single coopetition area, such 
as delivery service for online retailers or aftersales service for household appliances manufacturers, or 
multiple areas, as applied in the airline industry. 
As price and service are the most important factors that influence customer purchasing decisions 
and most firms invest significant resources to ensure optimal strategic and operational decisions on price 
and service, we therefore take price and service as the entry points to study coopetition. We specify two 
market scenarios. Under these two scenarios, in addition to the influence of the focal firm’s price and 
service, customer demand is also affected by its rival firm’s price and service. Under each specified 
scenario, first, we use non-cooperative games to develop the competition models in which firms only 
compete with each other to maximize their own profits. Second, we use the cooperative games to 
develop coopetition models in which the two rival firms make joint decisions on prices and/or service 
levels in order to seek a win-win scenario in which firms increase profits between them. Since the main 
incentive for firms to engage in coopetition is to increase their individual profit, we also introduce a 
cost-sharing contract through which firms can share the cooperation cost and ensure that both firms are 
better off when there is an increase in total profit from coopetition. The power of cooperative game 
theory is in its ability to analyze value creation and capture in markets, especially in settings where firms’ 
dealings do not follow some predefined process (Brandenburger and Stuart 1996). Through studying the 
firms’ equilibrium decisions and a comparison of consequent financial performance, we examine the 
optimal strategies under different scenarios in an attempt to understand how the success of a coopetition 
strategy is affected by the characteristics of the market competition and how the nature of competition 
evolves under different coopetition strategies. 
The main contribution of this study to the extant literature on coopetition is twofold. First, this 
research uses non-cooperative and cooperative games to develop the competition and coopetition 
models and analyze how value is created and captured in the market. We examine the impact of the 
strategic choices among competition, service coopetition, and service and price coopetition on firms’ 
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operational decisions and performance. By modeling the intensity of the competition in the analytical 
models and different levels of coopetition (e.g., single- and dual-element coopetition), the systematic 
analyses provide insights into the dynamic relationship between competition and coopetition, as well as 
between the two competing elements in the dual-element coopetition. Such an exploration of the 
interactions between competition and cooperation provides some novel predictions around firms’ 
strategic behaviors that have not been observed in existing theoretical perspectives (Peng et al. 2012; 
Dahl 2014; Dorn et al. 2016). Second, our research provides some interesting insights that have not been 
captured in the previous literature. Through the examination of the coopetition effect on firms’ total 
profits, we are able to identify the decision areas where the associated competition or coopetition 
strategies can have a positive economic impact. A further coordination mechanism, namely, a 
cooperation cost-sharing contract, is also proposed to enable coopetition strategies to deliver better 
financial performance. Based on the findings, a two-dimensional decision framework (price and service) 
is developed to provide strategic guidance for firm decisions on coopetition strategies. Practically, it is 
beneficial for firms to make optimal strategic decisions that enhance their competitive capabilities in 
challenging market environments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in Section 
2. In Section 3, the model formulation and assumptions are presented. Section 4 examines the impact of 
coopetition on firms’ operational decision making and economic performance in the symmetric case in 
which the two firms have an identical level of service-investment efficiency. In Section 5, we extend 
our analysis to an asymmetric case, in which the two firms have different levels of service-investment 
efficiency. We derive the optimal pricing and service level decisions and discuss the effects of service-
investment efficiency on the firm’s strategic and operational decisions in different market scenarios. 
Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions and highlight possible directions for future work.  
 
2 Literature review 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) provide a broad definition that views coopetition as a value net 
consisting of a firm’s suppliers, customers, competitors, and complementors. Their interdependence 
involves both competitive and collaborative elements, with rivalry as well as collaborative mechanisms, 
in the course of profit maximization for the firms. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) give a narrow definition 
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that regards coopetition as a dyadic relationship involving firms’ simultaneous engagement in 
competition and cooperation. Although there are various definitions and conceptualizations of 
coopetition, along with their respective levels, these all closely relate to either broad or narrow 
definitions, which are branded by Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) as the actor or the activity schools 
of thought, respectively. The underlying concept of the actor school of thought is the “value-net,” in 
which actors cooperate to create a larger cake and then compete to divide it up; the activity school of 
thought concentrates on simultaneous competitive and cooperative relationships, rather than a network 
context (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016). 
In view of the growing interest among management researchers in coopetition in the past two 
decades, some comprehensive systematic reviews (Stein 2010; Bouncken et al. 2015; Bengtsson and 
Raza-Ullah 2016; Dorn et al. 2016) have been conducted to foster a better understanding of the 
coopetition phenomenon, along with suggestions for strengthening this research area in the future. 
Among them, Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) integrate key critical themes into a Driver, Process, and 
Outcomes framework in an attempt to provide a richer and more complete perspective of the coopetition 
phenomenon. Dorn et al. (2016), in their systematic review of coopetition contributions in the 
management literature, analyze and synthesize coopetition research and highlight five multilevel areas 
for future investigation: (1) nature of the relationship, (2) governance and management, (3) output of 
the relationship, (4) actor characteristics, and (5) environmental characteristics. Readers may refer to 
these recent review works for more information about coopetition. In order to refine the research 
questions and highlight our contributions, the review presented below mainly focuses on the following 
two aspects: the intensity of competition and cooperation; and the dynamics of coopetition.  
2.1 Price and service competition  
As setting price and service levels are important operational management decisions, many studies have 
considered price and service dual-dimension competition in the investigation of various business 
problems. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) study a distribution system in which two retailers purchase product 
from a common manufacturer and use service as well as retail price to compete directly for end 
customers. They show that the relative intensity of competition with respect to price and service 
dimensions plays a key role. Bernstein and Federgruen (2004) develop a stochastic general equilibrium 
inventory model considering three competition scenarios and including service level and price. As an 
extension, Bernstein and Federgruen (2007) later develop a decentralized supply chain, with long-term 
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competition between independent retailers facing random demands while buying from a common 
supplier, and study a coordination problem under price and service competition. They compare the 
coordination mechanisms when retailers compete only in terms of their prices, and when they engage in 
simultaneous price and service competition. Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) study the price-service 
competition between the two channels of a manufacturer (direct channel and retail channel) and find 
that an increase in the retailer’s service quality may increase the manufacturer’s profit, while a larger 
range of customer service sensitivity may benefit both parties. Xiao and Yang (2008) develop a price-
service competition model of two supply chains with one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse 
retailer. They find that the impact of the rival’s risk sensitivity on the retailer’s decision depends on 
price-service competition intensity. Lu et al. (2011) investigate a supply chain with two manufacturers 
and a common retailer. Both service and price competition exist between the two products, because each 
manufacturer provides services directly to customers and the retailer sells competing products to end 
consumers. Wu (2012) examines price and service competition problems in a remanufactured product 
supply chain and finds that fierce price competition is more profitable to the remanufacturer, leading to 
a higher service level. The above research only incorporates the price-service competition in the 
investigation of different operational decisions, but does not consider the probability that the firms can 
cooperate on the competing elements. Very recently, Jena and Sarmah (2016) examine price and service 
coopetition under uncertain demand conditions in a remanufacturing system context. Although the 
effects of price and service competition are analyzed, they do not examine the effect of the intensity of 
competition or whether the level of cooperation affects firms’ strategic decisions on coopetition.  
2.2 Competition intensity and cooperation level 
As discussed, the market competition of a focal firm’s industry is often one of the main reasons for its 
decision to engage in a coopetition strategy. In fact, the competition intensity within the industry has an 
impact on the benefits of a coopetition strategy. In an empirical study of a cross-industry survey of 209 
Finnish firms on the effects of coopetition strategy on firms’ innovation and market performance, Ritala 
(2012) found that the success of the coopetition strategy is affected by market uncertainty, network 
externalities, and competitive intensity in many different ways. In highly competitive market 
environments, where there are a number of rival firms offering substitutive products (Dussauge et al. 
2000), or in a less competitive environment where there is only a limited number of competitors offering 
similar products (Peng and Bourne 2009), coopetition can be an effective strategy. According to Oxley 
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et al. (2009), on the one hand, cooperation with competitors will make the involved businesses more 
profitable by moderating the intensity of competition in the industry; on the other hand, cooperation will 
also improve business performance, because of the increased competitiveness among the partnering 
firms compared with other firms. The argument put forward by Oxley et al. (2009) partially explains 
how firms can benefit from coopetition in conditions of either high or low competition intensity. A 
coopetition strategy is important to soften the intense market competition between rival firms or to 
enhance the competitiveness of the partnering firms when fighting against other rivals in a tight 
competition. 
Despite its importance to firms’ strategic decisions on engagement and the success of the strategy, 
there are general methodological concerns when measuring competition and cooperation intensity in the 
coopetition research. Among such studies, Luo et al. (2016) pointed out that not incorporating 
coopetition intensity in their study of coopetition in low carbon manufacturing was a research limitation. 
They called for future research that accounted for the intensity of coopetition in the modeling when 
examining the impact of coopetition strategy on firm decisions and performance. When discussing future 
research avenues for coopetition research, Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) also called for the 
development of new scales for coopetition that could measure the intensity of competition and 
cooperation, as well as the similarity in their levels. 
2.3 Dynamics of coopetition 
One distinguishing feature of coopetition is that it is a relationship that contains both competition and 
cooperation elements simultaneously (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Bengtsson and Kock 2000). 
The simultaneous pursuit of competition and cooperation can cause tension between activities and 
counterparts due to rising internal disagreement (Bengtsson and Kock 2000). Competition emphasizes 
individual benefits, a zero-sum game, and opportunistic behavior, whereas cooperation promotes 
common benefits, collective interests, and goodwill (Khanna et al. 1998; Das and Teng 2000). Raza-
Ullah et al. (2014) suggest that competition and cooperation are paradoxical forces leading to ambivalent 
emotions within organizations. It is inevitable that there are tensions inherent in coopetition, due to the 
conflicting logic behind competition and cooperation (Das and Teng 2000; Bello et al. 2010; Dorn et al. 
2016). As a result, the actors involved may experience ambivalent emotions and tensions that stem from 




Many researchers argue that there is a balanced relationship that requires an optimal combination 
of competitive and cooperative forces (Bengtsson and Kock 2000; Das and Teng 2000; Quintana-García 
and Benavides-Velasco 2004; Chen 2008; Cassiman et al. 2009; Peng and Bourne 2009; Dorn et al. 
2016). Das and Teng (2000) point out that the stability of a strategic alliance relies on a balance between 
competition and cooperation. Luo (2004) suggests that coopetition can be closely interrelated with the 
paradox-solving yin–yang philosophy. He argues that such philosophy naturally fosters coopetition. 
Similarly, Chen (2008) reconceptualizes coopetitive relationships through an integration of the paradox 
perspective and the Chinese “middle way” philosophy, and suggests that the two opposite forces may 
be interdependent in nature and thus together form a totality. Peng and Bourne (2009) argue that it is 
easier to balance competition and cooperation if there are complementary, but distinctly different sets of 
resources between the two firms, as well as at the network level, if there are compatible but different 
network structures. Park et al. (2014) develop the concept of “balance” in coopetition and examine the 
effect of the balance between competition and cooperation on firms’ innovation performance. In their 
empirical study of the semiconductor industry, they report that an optimal coopetition balance generates 
a positive impact on innovation performance. Nevertheless, as Dorn et al. (2016) point out in their 
review of coopetition, although the existing literature encourages exploration of the balance between 
competitive and cooperative forces, the challenge is to answer these two questions: what is the optimal 
balance and how can it be achieved?  
Adding to the complexity of the problem, the coopetitive relationship between firms is dynamic, 
and it may become balanced or imbalanced and change over time (Peng et al. 2012; Dahl 2014; Park et 
al. 2014; Dorn et al. 2016). Dahl (2014) shows that the interplay of competitive and cooperative elements 
of the relationship creates the coopetition dynamics. Coopetition is regarded by many researchers to 
have the potential to affect the competitive dynamics within an industry (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001; 
Bengtsson et al. 2010; Ritala 2012). For instance, Niu et al. (2015) find that the partnership between the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and its competitive Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) 
mitigates the competition between them in the consumer market. Peng et al. (2012) argue that one firm’s 
market power could be relatively strengthened through cooperation, and as a result, increase the intensity 
of competition. Furthermore, firm behavior might shift from cooperative to somewhat competitive in a 
multilateral alliance where others reduce their input into the relationships (Ritala and Tidström 2014). It 
is even more challenging to maintain the dynamic balance between competition and cooperation if 
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external motives and factors are required to establish such a balance. 
From a methodology perspective, different approaches have been applied to study coopetition. 
Despite the call for game theory methods by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) in their seminal work 
on coopetition, the majority of coopetition research follows the resource-based view (Lado et al. 1997; 
Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco 2004; Ritala 2012) or a network approach (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001; Peng and Bourne 2009; Wilhelm 2011) using conceptual or empirical investigation. 
Only a few studies (Gurnani et al. 2007; Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Carfì and Schiliro et al. 2012; 
Luo et al. 2016) have applied game theory to coopetitive decision problems. As acknowledged by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), there is significant potential benefit in investigating how game 
theory can be used to explore coopetition in complicated and realistic situations, especially the 
relationship between the incentives and the levels of competition, cooperation, and coopetition in inter-
firm relationships. Most relevant to this study is the biform game reviewed by Cachon and Netessine 
(2006). The similarity is that both non-cooperative and cooperative games are included. The difference 
is that the biform game is usually a two-stage game in which the first stage is the non-cooperative game 
and the second is the cooperative game; moreover, there is usually no specific outcome of the 
cooperative sub-game. However, in our coopetition model, the non-cooperative game is to maximize 
individual profit, while the cooperative game is to maximize total profits of both firms. In addition, the 
decision making in our model is simultaneous. This simultaneous game is a standard way to model 
coopetition and has been used in many representative studies in the literature. For instance, Tsay and 
Agrawal (2000) analyze the dynamics of retail competition under two scenarios. The first one is that the 
two non-cooperating retailers are in a competitive environment, in which they make their own price and 
service level decisions simultaneously to maximize their own profit. The other scenario considers 
cooperating retailers, in which they make decisions simultaneously and cooperate to maximize their 
total profit. Zhang and Frazier (2011) consider three competing firms selling substitutable goods in the 
same market, where two of them form an alliance in the coopetition game. In the study, firms make their 
pricing policies at the same time. Recently, Jena and Sarmah (2016) study price and service coopetition 
among two remanufacturers considering uncertain demand and condition of the acquired items. They 
consider four different configurations of remanufacturing, in which the difference between the global 
system and integrated system depends on whether the two remanufacturing firms cooperate or not. When 
the firms cooperate, the total profit is maximized. In addition, the remanufacturing firms choose their 
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policies simultaneously among the four different configurations. In our paper, we also follow this 
theoretical approach.  
In summary, despite increasing interest among practitioners and academics and a growing number 
of studies on coopetition in various areas of management, as far as we know, there is limited research 
using a game-theory approach to investigate service and price coopetition and the impact of the strategic 
choice between competition or service and price coopetition on firm performance. Our research aims to 
fill this gap in the literature and explore this approach by systematically looking at how competition 
intensity affects firms’ strategic decisions on coopetition, and conversely, how coopetition has an impact 
on the nature of market competition. 
 
3 Model description and assumption 
To clearly depict the coopetition relationship, we consider two competing firms, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} 
and 𝑗 = 3 − 𝑖, which sell similar products directly to end-users. The firms decide their own retail price 
𝑝𝑖 and service level 𝑠𝑖, respectively, and then achieve product demand 𝑞𝑖:  
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖) + 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑘(𝑠𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖) 
The competition coefficients are 𝑏 and 𝑘, where 𝑏 ≥ 0 and 𝑘 ≥ 0 and measure the intensity of 
price and service competition between the two firms (Choi 1996; Tsay and Agrawal 2000). Higher values 
of 𝑏  or 𝑘  indicates higher levels of competition intensity of price or service, respectively. 
Consequently, the self-price sensitivity is defined as 1 + 𝑏 and self-service sensitivity is defined as 
1 + 𝑘. This form of linear determinist demand function has been extensively used in economics (e.g., 
Vives 1999) and operations management literature (e.g., Shin and Tunca 2010; Ha et al. 2011; Shang et 





2, where 𝑡𝑖 is an investment parameter defined as service-investment efficiency. This 
convex form of the service cost function suggests that the marginal cost of the provided service results 
in an additional unit service level, that is, improving unit service will be more difficult and requires more 
cost. The assumption is reasonable due to the “lowest-hanging fruit” consideration by a rational manager 
(Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Wu 2012; Chen et al. 2017). We denote our parameters and variables for model 
development as shown in Table 1.  




𝑞1 ,  𝑞2 Customer demand of firms 1 and 2, respectively 
𝑝1 , 𝑝2 Unit retail price of firms 1 and 2, respectively 
𝑠1 , 𝑠2 Service level of firms 1 and 2, respectively 
𝑐 Unit manufacturing cost, 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑝1 and 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑝2 
𝐶𝑝, 𝐶𝑠, 𝐶ℎ 
Cost of cooperation in pricing, service, and both competition factors in coopetition model with 
double competition factors 
𝑎 The primary market size, 𝑎 > 0 
 𝑏 Price competition coefficient, 𝑏 ≥ 0 
𝑘 Service competition coefficient, 𝑘 ≥ 0 
𝑡1 , 𝑡2 
An investment parameter and a function of service-investment efficiency of firms 1 and 2, 
respectively, 𝑡1, 𝑡2 > 0 
𝐼1 , 𝐼2 The service investment of firms 1 and 2, respectively 
𝑀𝑖 2(1 + 𝑏)𝑡𝑖 − (1 + 𝑘)
2 
𝑁𝑖 𝑏𝑡𝑖 − (1 + 𝑘)𝑘 
𝐴𝑖 
(𝑎 − 𝑐)(𝑀𝑗 + 𝑁𝑗)
𝑀1𝑀2 − 𝑁1𝑁2
 
𝑋𝑖 𝑀𝑖 − 𝑘
2 
𝑌𝑖 𝑁𝑖 − 𝑘(1 + 𝑘) 
𝑍𝑖  2𝑁𝑖 
𝐵𝑖  








(𝑎 − 𝑐)[2(1 + 2𝑏)𝑡𝑗 − (1 + 𝑘)(1 + 2𝑘)]
2𝑡1[2(1 + 2𝑏)𝑡2 − (1 + 𝑘)(1 + 𝑏 + 𝑘)] + (1 + 𝑘)[(1 + 𝑘)(1 + 2𝑘) − 2(1 + 𝑏 + 𝑘)𝑡2]
 
𝑆 




(𝑎 − 𝑐)(𝑡2 − 𝑡1)(1 + 2𝑘)𝑘
𝑋1𝑋2 − 𝑍1𝑍2
 
Note: The parameters from 𝑀𝑖  to 𝑇  are defined to simplify the mathematical expressions of propositions, 
lemmas, and their proofs. 
Based on the above model description and assumption, the profit function of firm 1, denoted by 
𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1), is  




2                    (1) 
The first term is the profit from product sale and the second term represents the service cost. 
Similarly, firm 2’s profit, denoted by 𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2), is 
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2                    (2) 
To ensure convexity of the profit functions of firms 1 and 2, we assume that 0 < 𝑘 <
𝑚𝑖𝑛{√2𝑡1(𝑏 + 1), √2𝑡2(𝑏 + 1)} − 1 for any 𝑏 ≥ 0 and 𝑡1, 𝑡2 > 0. 
In the coopetition model with both price and service competition, we assume the cost of cooperation 
in pricing and service provision is 𝐶𝑝 and 𝐶𝑠, respectively. In addition, the cost of cooperation both in 
pricing and service provisioning is 𝐶ℎ. Without loss of generality, the cost of dual element cooperation 
is larger than in the single element cooperation scenario (price or service), namely, 𝐶ℎ > 𝐶𝑝 and 𝐶ℎ >
𝐶𝑠. Therefore, the joint profit of firms 1 and 2, denoted by 𝜋ξ(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2), is 
𝜋𝜉(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2) = 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1) + 𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2) − 𝐶𝜉             (3) 
In the coopetition model, firm 1 and firm 2 share the cooperation cost with a contract parameter. A 
cost-sharing contract is introduced here, which is commonly employed in business practice. For example, 
a recent agreement between Morrisons, the fourth-largest supermarket in the United Kingdom, and 
Ocado, a leading online grocery retailer, enables the supermarket chain to expand online delivery service 
to a large region of England in 2017. Despite competing in the same online grocery market, the 
cooperation between the two firms through a contractual agreement of service cost-sharing ensures 
efficient resource use and strengthens their competitive capabilities over market rivals. Moreover, it is 
also easy to execute, since there is only one contract parameter that needs to be negotiated. Here, we 
assume that firm 1 shares 𝛽𝜉  of the cooperation cost, while firm 2 shares 1 − 𝛽𝜉 of it (0 < 𝛽𝜉 < 1). 
Thus, in the coopetition model, the profit of firm 1 is 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1) − 𝛽𝜉𝐶𝜉 and the profit of firm 1 is 
𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2) − (1 − 𝛽𝜉)𝐶𝜉. The fraction 𝛽𝜉 can be a cost-sharing contract between the two firms, which 
is determined when they engage in cooperation, where 𝜉 ∈ {𝑝, 𝑠, ℎ}. 
We assume that firms pursue self-interest and thus they can choose to cooperate on pricing and/or 
service with the rival firm to maximize their own profits. We attempt to analyze the impact of the 
strategic choice of coopetition on a firm’s optimal operational decisions on price and service and its 
financial performance.  
 
4 Service and price coopetition model 
We start the analysis in a symmetric case that assumes the two firms’ service-investment efficiencies are 
identical (𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡). We look at the following scenarios: (i) the competition model; (ii) the service 
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coopetition model; and (iii) the price coopetition model. We analyze the two firms’ optimal solutions in 
the three scenarios, respectively, and explore the effect of the intensity of price and service competition 
on firm strategic choice. 
4.1 Equilibrium in competition and coopetition models 
In the competition model where customer demand is influenced by both price and service, firm 1 and 




In the price coopetition model, firms 1 and 2 cooperate on price only. They make their decisions 
on service separately, but make pricing decisions jointly. Such practices are common in the iron ore 
industry, where large miners (e.g., Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton) cooperate on pricing decisions to avoid 
price wars and influence the market price. Meanwhile, decisions are made separately regarding the 





𝜋𝑝(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2) . Similarly, the decision problem of firm 2 is 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠2
𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2)  and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝2
𝜋𝑝(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2). 
In the service coopetition model, firms 1 and 2 cooperate on service only. They make their pricing 
decisions separately and make service level decisions jointly. Using the agreement between Morrisons 
and Ocado as an example, the two grocery retailers make their own pricing decisions, and at the same 
time, they collaboratively make decisions on the delivery service to their customers and the service cost-
sharing contract. Therefore, the decision problem of firm 1 is 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝1
𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1)  and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠1
𝜋𝑠(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2) . Similarly, the decision problem of firm 2 is 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝2
𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2)  and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠2
𝜋𝑠(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2). 
In the dual-element coopetition model, firms 1 and 2 cooperate on both price and service. They 
jointly make price and service level decisions. Using the strategic alliance in the airline industry as an 
example, major airlines collaboratively make decisions on price and service provision for the purpose 
of maximizing the financial benefit of the alliance and its collaborating firms. Therefore, the decision 
problem of firms 1 and 2 is 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2
𝜋ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2). 
Regarding the firms’ optimal prices (?̅?𝑖
𝑛) and service levels (?̅?𝑖





) and service level (?̅?𝑖
𝑝
) in the price coopetition model, optimal prices (?̅?𝑖
𝑠) and service level 
(?̅?𝑖
𝑠) in the service coopetition model, and optimal prices (?̅?𝑖
ℎ) and service level (?̅?𝑖
ℎ) in the dual-element 
coopetition model when 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, the following lemma is obtained. 
Lemma 1. There exist unique optimal pricing and service policies in the competition model, the 
price coopetition model, the service coopetition model, and the dual-element coopetition model when 
𝒕𝟏 = 𝒕𝟐 = 𝒕 , that is, ?̅?𝒊



































4.2 Effect of coopetition with both price and service competition 
In this section, we focus on firms’ strategic behavior and the effect of the competition and coopetition 
strategy on firm operational decisions and financial performance in a setting that considers both price 
and service competition. The following proposition can be obtained. 























From this proposition, we see that the retail price is highest in the price coopetition model and 
lowest in the service coopetition model. The retail prices in the competition and dual-element 
coopetition models are somewhere in the middle. Therefore, we can conclude that price coopetition can 











𝑠). In contrast, the service level is highest 
in the price competition model and lowest in the service coopetition model, while the competition and 
high coopetition models are somewhere in the middle. Therefore, we can conclude that service 











ℎ). For the relationship 
between the competition and dual-element coopetition models, the optimal decisions are dependent on 
price and service competition, as well as service-investment efficiency. All in all, we can summarize the 
above in the following remark. 
Remark 1. Coopetition will change the dynamics of price and service competition: cooperation 
                                                             
1 Note that a high coopetition model considered as price cooperation is executed in the service coopetition model; and one 
as service cooperation is executed in the price coopetition model. 
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on price (service) eases the intensity of price (service) competition, and at the same time, increases 
the intensity of service (price) competition. 

































































− (1 − 𝛽ℎ)𝐶ℎ, 𝜋𝑛 =
[2(1+𝑏)𝑡−(1+𝑘)2](𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
[(2+𝑏)𝑡−𝑘−1]2







− 𝐶𝑠, and 𝜋ℎ =
(𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
2(2𝑡−1)
− 𝐶ℎ. The following lemma can be obtained.  
Lemma 2. 1) Between the competition and price coopetition models, when 𝒌 < 𝒌𝒔, there exists 
a curve 𝒃 = 𝒃∗(𝒌) making 𝝅𝒏|𝒃=𝒃∗(𝒌) = 𝝅𝒑. 
2) Between the competition and service coopetition models, when 𝒃 < 𝒃𝒑, there exists a curve 
𝒌 = 𝒌∗(𝒃) making 𝝅𝒏|𝒌=𝒌∗(𝒃) = 𝝅𝒔. 
3) Between the price coopetition and dual-element coopetition models, there exists a curve 𝒌 =
𝒌𝒔 making 𝝅𝒑|𝒌=𝒌𝒔 = 𝝅𝒉. 
4) Between the service coopetition and dual-element coopetition models, there exists a curve 
𝒃 = 𝒃𝒑 making 𝝅𝒔|𝒃=𝒃𝒑 = 𝝅𝒉. 
From this lemma and its proof, we can clearly see that in the price coopetition model with dual 
competition elements, for any service competition coefficient 𝑘, there is a “reactive price competition” 
𝑏(𝑘) where the strategic choice between competition and price coopetition makes no difference. When 
the price competition coefficient is lower than 𝑏∗(𝑘), the total profit of the competition mode is larger 
than in the price coopetition model (𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑝); and when the price competition coefficient is higher than 
𝑏∗(𝑘) where 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑠, the total profit of the competition model is smaller than in the price coopetition 
model (𝜋𝑛 < 𝜋𝑝). Given the price coopetition model, there is a line 𝑘 = 𝑘
𝑠 where the strategic choice 
between price coopetition and high coopetition makes no difference. When the service competition is 
higher than a critical value 𝑘𝑠, the total profit in the high coopetition model is larger than in the price 
coopetition model (𝜋𝑝 < 𝜋ℎ). 
In the service coopetition model with dual competition elements, for any price competition 
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coefficient 𝑏 , there is a “reactive price competition” 𝑘(𝑏)  where the strategic choice between 
competition and service coopetition makes no difference. Therefore, for any price competition 
coefficient 𝑏, when the actual service competition intensity is lower than 𝑘∗(𝑏), the total profit of the 
competition model is larger than the service coopetition model (𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠); and when the actual service 
competition is higher than 𝑘∗(𝑏) where 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑝, the total profit of the competition model is smaller 
than the service coopetition model (𝜋𝑛 < 𝜋𝑠). Given the service coopetition model, there is a line 𝑏 =
𝑏𝑝 where the strategic choice between service coopetition and high coopetition makes no difference. 
When the price competition is higher than a critical value 𝑏𝑝, the total profit in the high coopetition 
model is larger than in the service coopetition model (𝜋𝑠 < 𝜋ℎ). 
Although we obtain the critical point (curve) that determines whether coopetition increases or 
decreases joint profits, to cooperate or not is also dependent on the cost-sharing contract parameter. 
Corollary 1. 1) When price competition is relatively high and the cost-sharing contract 












 , both 
firms are willing to cooperate on price instead of no cooperation; 













, both firms are willing to cooperate on service instead of no 
cooperation; 
3) When both price and service competition are relatively high and the cost-sharing contract 












, both firms are willing to cooperate on both price and service.  
This corollary shows us that the cost-sharing contract parameter, through which the cost can be 
divided between the two firms to ensure a win-win outcome of coopetition, is a favorable strategy for 
each firm in the price and service coopetition models. Therefore, from Lemma 2, we can obtain the 
following proposition, which provides the optimal solution for the strategic choice of competition or 
coopetition.  
Proposition 2. The curves 𝒌 = 𝒌∗(𝒃) , 𝒃 = 𝒃∗(𝒌) , 𝒃 = 𝒃𝒑  and 𝒌 = 𝒌𝒔  divide the two-
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dimensional competition and coopetition region into four decision areas, shown in Figure 1: 
1) Region I {(𝒃, 𝒌)|𝟎 < 𝑏 < 𝒃∗(𝒌) ∩ 𝟎 < 𝑘 < 𝒌∗(𝒃)}  where 𝟎 < 𝑏 < 𝒃𝒑  and 𝟎 < 𝑘 < 𝒌𝒔 , 
competition only is the optimal strategy; 
2) Region II {(𝒃, 𝒌)|𝒃 > 𝒃∗(𝒌) ∩ 𝟎 < 𝑘 < 𝒌𝒔}, price coopetition is the optimal strategy; 
3) Region III {(𝒃, 𝒌)|𝟎 < 𝑏 < 𝒃𝒑 ∩ 𝒌 > 𝒌∗(𝒃)}, service coopetition is the optimal strategy; 
4) Region IV {(𝒃, 𝒌)|𝒃 > 𝒃𝒑 ∩ 𝒌 > 𝒌𝒔} , both price and service coopetition is the optimal 
strategy. 
 
In the competitive market environment where rival firms compete with each other for customer 
demand using both price and service, excessive competition on price or service may lead to a pricing 
war with rival competitors or soaring service costs. As a result, such excessive competition will have a 
negative impact on a firm’s financial performance. Firms can choose to ease the intensity of competition 
by cooperating with rival firms on price and/or service (Oxley et al. 2009). This proposition provides a 
clear guideline for such an important strategic decision. As illustrated in Figure 1, there are four decision 
regions specified by two decision curves, including competition strategy, price coopetition strategy, 
service coopetition strategy, and high coopetition strategy that involves both price and service 
coopetition. 
For the rival firms, if price and service competition is relatively low, both firms will benefit from a 
competition strategy. They are able to achieve higher profits by competing purely with rival firms than 
by cooperating with rival firms on price and/or service. If service competition is relatively low, but price 
Figure 1. Coopetition mode selection based on both price and service competition 
𝑘 
𝑏 0 
𝑏 = 𝑏∗(𝑘) 









𝑏 = 𝑏𝑝 
𝑘 = 𝑘𝑠 
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competition intense, price coopetition is the best strategy for the rival firms. The high price competition 
intensity will drive firms to lower prices and lead to smaller profit margins. This finding is supported by 
the practice in the iron ore industry, where large miners engage in price coopetition, but not service 
coopetition. Price coopetition, on the one hand, can mitigate the risk of a pricing war; on the other hand, 
it will stimulate firms to raise service levels and consequently intensify service competition. If there is 
relatively low-price competition, but intense service competition, service coopetition is the most suitable 
strategy. This finding is supported by practices in the online grocery sector and the household appliance 
sector. In these sectors, the product prices are transparent in the market and there is low differentiation 
in prices between the major players. In contrast, consumers become more sensitive to the service level 
(i.e., delivery service for online grocery retailers and aftersales service for household appliance 
manufacturers). Consequently, these firms are more likely to engage in service coopetition than price 
coopetition. The high service competition intensity will force firms to raise their service levels, which 
requires a larger service investment. The service coopetition, on the one hand, can reduce the required 
investment by easing the service competition intensity, but on the other hand, provide incentives to firms 
to reduce retail prices in order to trigger more customer demand and consequently intensify price 
competition. If there is intense price and service competition, either price or service coopetition alone is 
only a suboptimal solution and there always exists Pareto optimality. A high coopetition mode that 
includes both price and service coopetition is the right strategic choice, which is supported by the 
strategic alliance example in the airline industry. We summarize the above findings in the following 
remark.  
Remark 2. The strategic choice of competition, price coopetition, service coopetition, or price 
and service coopetition is dependent on the intensity of the price and service competition, and the 
appropriate design of the cooperation cost-sharing contract. 
 
5 Extended model: the asymmetric case 
The analytical results in the previous section are obtained under the assumption that the two firms have 
the same service-investment efficiency. To generalize our findings, we look at firms’ strategic behavior 
regarding coopetition and its effect on operational decisions and financial performance when service-
investment efficiency differs between the two firms, namely, 𝑡1 ≠ 𝑡2. Without loss of generality, we 
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assume 𝑡1 < 𝑡2. That is, the service-investment efficiency of firm 1 is higher than that of firm 2.  
5.1 Equilibrium in the coopetition models 
This part of analysis provides the optimal pricing and service level policies in the asymmetric case. The 
firms’ optimal prices (𝑝𝑖
𝑛) and service levels (𝑠𝑖





) in the price coopetition model, optimal prices (𝑝𝑖
𝑠) and service levels (𝑠𝑖
𝑠) in the 
service coopetition model, and optimal prices ( 𝑝𝑖
ℎ ) and service levels ( 𝑠𝑖
ℎ ) in the dual-element 
coopetition model, are obtained as illustrated in the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. There exist unique optimal pricing and service policies in the competition model, the 
price coopetition model, the service coopetition model, and dual-element coopetition model, which 
are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Optimal policies with both price and service competition 
 
Competition 
(𝜉 = 𝑛) 
Price coopetition 
(𝜉 = 𝑝) 
Service coopetition 
(𝜉 = 𝑠) 
Dual-element coopetition 
(𝜉 = ℎ) 
𝑝1
𝜉
 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐴1 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐷1 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐵1 − 𝑆 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐶1 − 𝑇 
𝑝2
𝜉
 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐴2 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐷2 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐵2 + 𝑆 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐶2 + 𝑇 
𝑠1
𝜉
 (1 + 𝑘)𝐴1 (1 + 𝑘)𝐷1 𝐵1 𝐶1 
𝑠2
𝜉
 (1 + 𝑘)𝐴2 (1 + 𝑘)𝐷2 𝐵2 𝐶2 
Note: the proof can be found in the proof of Lemma 3. 
5.2 Effect of service-investment efficiency on decisions 
Now we analyze the effect of service-investment efficiency on firms’ optimal solution of pricing and 
service level. The following proposition can be obtained.  

























, where 𝝃 ∈ {𝒏, 𝒔, 𝒑, 𝒉}. 
Here, 𝑡1 < 𝑡2 means that the service-investment efficiency of firm 1 is higher than that of firm 2. 
Hence, from this proposition, we know that the firm with high service-investment efficiency will provide 
higher service levels than that with low service-investment efficiency. It is logical for firms to behave 
in this way, as most firms will maximize the benefit of their competitive advantages. In this case, high 
service-investment efficiency incentivizes the firm to invest more on service to increase its customer 
demand. Meanwhile, the increased demand from the high service level enables the firm to set relatively 
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higher retail prices in order to achieve higher marginal profits and lower the expense ratio.  
5.3 Effect of service-investment efficiency on strategic choice 
We now examine the impact of service-investment efficiency on firms’ optimal strategic decision on 
coopetition in the asymmetric case. As the analytical solution in the asymmetric case is more 
complicated than that in the symmetric case, a numerical analysis is presented to illustrate the impact. 
Here, we specify that 𝑎 = 200, 𝑐 = 20, 𝑡1 = 200 and 𝑡2 = 300, 𝐶𝑝 = 1500, and 𝐶𝑠 = 200. In 
the scenarios with different price and service competition intensity, we provide the firm’s optimal 
strategic choice between competition and coopetition, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Coopetition strategy choice based on both price and service competition 
From Figure 2, we find that, in the asymmetric case where the service-investment efficiency is 
different between the two firms, the optimal strategic choice on coopetition is similar to that in the 
asymmetric case (see Figure 1). We can clearly see that competition (Region I) is suitable for the 
situation when the intensity of both price and service competition is relatively low. In contrast, when 
both price and service competition intensity is high (Region IV), a high level of coopetition, which 
includes both price and service coopetition, is the optimal strategy. However, in the situation where one 
element (e.g., price or service) dominates market competition, the optimal strategy for the rival firms is 
to cooperate on this element. This further demonstrates that the strategic choice between competition 
and coopetition is mainly determined by the intensity of price and service competition. 
b
k














From Lemma 3, Proposition 3, and Figure 2, it is clear that the service-investment efficiency (𝑡1, 𝑡2) 
makes an impact on firms’ optimal operational decisions (i.e., prices and service level) as well as the 
value of important critical decision curves that influence firms’ optimal decisions on coopetition strategy. 
Nevertheless, the structural results presented in the symmetric case (Section 4) still hold in the 
asymmetric case when the firms have different service-investment efficiency (𝑡1 ≠ 𝑡2). The above 
findings are summarized in the following remark. 
Remark 3: The internal operations capability (i.e., difference in service-investment efficiency) 
affects firms’ optimal decisions on price and service, but has a limited impact on the strategic decision 
on coopetition. In contrast, the strategic choice between competition and coopetition is mainly 
determined by the external market characteristics (i.e., the competition intensity of price and service), 
and it applies to both the symmetric and asymmetric cases.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This research explores optimal firm coopetition strategy, considering the intensity of competition and 
the dynamics of coopetition. First, coopetition models are developed in which the two firms are assumed 
to have the same service-investment efficiency. We examine the impact of strategic choice between 
competition and coopetition through comparing the optimal solutions on pricing and service level and 
optimal profits in various competition and coopetition models. We then extend our analysis to the 
asymmetric case in which the two firms have different service-investment efficiencies. Based on the 
analysis, a decision framework for coopetition strategy is proposed for both symmetric and asymmetric 
scenarios. The decision framework enables firms to make optimal strategic decisions on coopetition 
under various market conditions. The main research findings are as follows. 
The strategic decision on coopetition (e.g., whether to compete or cooperate with a competitor and 
how to cooperate) depends on the intensity of the market competition. This finding supports the view of 
Oxley et al. (2009) and Ritala (2012), who claim that the success of coopetition strategies is affected by 
competition intensity. The same rule applies to both single- and dual-element coopetition. In the single-
element coopetition scenario, rival firms will choose to compete only if there is low service (price) 
competition, and they will prefer to cooperate on service (price) if there is high service (price) 
competition in this single element. For the dual-element competition scenario, rival firms will choose to 
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compete on the element(s) (e.g., price and/service) if there is low intensity of price and/or service 
competition(s). In contrast, they will prefer to cooperate on price and/or service if there is high price 
and/or service competition. The above findings also apply to both symmetric and asymmetric cases in 
terms of service-investment efficiency. Furthermore, our analyses show that coopetition changes the 
dynamics of the competition and cooperation between the two rival firms. For instance, on the one hand, 
the coopetition eases the competition intensity of the cooperating element (e.g., price or service). On the 
other hand, the coopetition increases the competition intensity of the non-cooperating element, as the 
rival firms have to differentiate themselves in order to compete for customer demand. When the 
competition intensity reaches a critical point, it will also affect firms’ optimal coopetition strategies, and 
they may be worse off financially if they stick with the chosen coopetition strategy. 
The decision framework that includes coopetition along both price and service dimensions provides 
a richer representation of firms’ strategic behavior on coopetition. It suggests a broader set of decision 
outcomes than the traditional models that focus primarily on single-element coopetition, such as 
innovation or technology (Gnyawali and Park 2011; Luo et al. 2016). Considering the dynamic nature 
of the competition and cooperation duality (Luo 2007; Dahl 2014; Dorn et al. 2016), our exploration of 
the dynamics of coopetition can help researchers and managers better understand how an increase or 
decrease in competition will affect the benefits of coopetition strategies, and how the nature of 
competition is affected by changing organizational or environmental conditions triggered by coopetition 
decisions. In addition, the intensity, diversity, and dynamics of coopetition captured and explored in our 
analytical modeling are an important supplement to existing studies (Luo 2007; Ritala 2012; Dorn et al. 
2016) that highlight these areas as key issues to advance coopetition research.  
There are several directions for future investigations. First, this research only considers a dyadic 
coopetition relationship. However, as discussed in the literature, coopetition can also take place at the 
network level (e.g., Gnyawali et al. 2006; Peng and Bourne 2009; Schiavone and Simoni 2011) and a 
network setting may affect firms’ strategic and operational decisions regarding coopetition. Therefore, 
it would be interesting to explore the optimal coopetition strategy at the network level. Second, a linear 
additive deterministic demand function is adopted in this study. Although it has the advantage of being 
analytically more tractable and is widely applied in similar studies (Ha et al. 2011; Chen and Wang 2015; 
Shang et al. 2016), market uncertainty is one of the critical factors affecting the success of coopetition 
strategies (Ritala 2012). One future extension would be to investigate the research problem using 
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stochastic models to explore how demand uncertainty might influence the results. Finally, our 
coopetition models consider generic forms of coopetition, such as price and service. Although it has the 
advantage of allowing our findings to be generalized to various business environments, the research can 
be further improved by incorporating specific settings in the modeling to reflect the nature of businesses 
and their marketing environments. This would be an interesting case to consider; however, because it 
requires a very different mode of analysis, it is left for further research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Competition: From (1), we get 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑠1)
𝜕𝑝1





















= 1 + 𝑘 , and |
−2 − 2𝑏 1 + 𝑘
1 + 𝑘 −𝑡1
| = 2𝑡1(𝑏 + 1) − (𝑘 + 1)
2 > 0 . 
Therefore, 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1) is a concave function of 𝑝1 and 𝑠1.  
From (2), we obtain 
𝜕𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑝2
= 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − 𝑝2 − (1 + 𝑏)(𝑝2 − 𝑐) − 𝑘(𝑠1 − 𝑠2) + 𝑠2 and 
𝜕𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑠2
















= 1 + 𝑘 . So, |
−2 − 2𝑏 1 + 𝑘
1 + 𝑘 −𝑡2
| = 2𝑡2(𝑏 + 1) − (𝑘 + 1)
2 > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑠2) is a 













= 0 , we get 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐴1 , 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐴2 , 
𝑠1
𝑛 = (1 + 𝑘)𝐴1, and 𝑠2
𝑛 = (1 + 𝑘)𝐴2. When 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, we have ?̅?𝑖








Pricing coopetition: From (3), we get 
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑝1
= 𝑎 − 𝑝1 − (1 + 𝑏)(𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏(𝑝2 − c) +
𝑏(𝑝2 − 𝑝1) + 𝑠1 − 𝑘(𝑠2 − 𝑠1)  and 
𝜕𝜋𝑝(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑝2
= 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − 𝑝2 − (1 +








2 = −2 −








= 2𝑏 , then |
−2 − 2𝑏 2𝑏
2𝑏 −2 − 2𝑏
| = 4 + 8𝑏 > 0 . Therefore, 
𝜋𝑝(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2) is a concave function of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2.  
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From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑠1)
𝑑𝑠1




2 = −𝑡1 < 0 . Therefore, 
𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑠1) is a concave function of 𝑠1. Similarly, from (2), we get 
𝑑𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝑑𝑠2


















= 0 , we get 𝑝1
𝑝
= 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐷1 , 
𝑝2
𝑝
= 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐷2, 𝑠1
𝑝
= (1 + 𝑘)𝐷1, and 𝑠2
𝑝












Service coopetition: From (3), we get 
𝜕𝜋𝑠(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑠1
= (1 + 𝑘)(𝑝1 − 𝑐) − 𝑘(𝑝2 − 𝑐) − 𝑡1𝑠1  and 
𝜕𝜋𝑠(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑠2
















= 0, and |
−𝑡1 0
0 −𝑡2
| = 𝑡1𝑡2 > 0. Therefore, 
𝜋𝑠(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2) is a concave function of 𝑠1 and 𝑠2.  
From (1), we get 
𝑑𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑠1)
𝑑𝑝1












2 = −2 −













= 0 , we get 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑐 + 𝑡1𝐵1 − 𝑆 , 
𝑝2
𝑠 = c + 𝑡2𝐵2 + 𝑆 , 𝑠1
𝑠 = 𝐵1 , and 𝑠2
𝑠 = 𝐵2 . When 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 , we have ?̅?𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑐 +
(𝑎−𝑐)𝑡
(2+𝑏)𝑡−1






High coopetition: From (3), we get 
𝜕𝜋ℎ(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑝1




















= 1 + 𝑘 . So, we get |
−2 − 2𝑏 1 + 𝑘
1 + 𝑘 −𝑡1
| =
2𝑡1(1 + 𝑏) − (1 + 𝑘)
2 > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋ℎ(𝑝1, 𝑠1, 𝑝2, 𝑠2)  is a concave function of 𝑝1  and 𝑠1 . 
Similarly, we get 
𝜕𝜋ℎ(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑝2
= 𝑎 + 𝑐 + 2𝑏𝑝1 − 2𝑝2 − 2𝑏𝑝2 − 𝑘𝑠1 + 𝑠2 + 𝑘𝑠2  and 
𝜕𝜋ℎ(𝑝1,𝑠1,𝑝2,𝑠2)
𝜕𝑠2


















= 1 + 𝑘. Thus, we get |
−2 − 2𝑏 1 + 𝑘
1 + 𝑘 −𝑡2
| =
2𝑡2(1 + 𝑏) − (1 + 𝑘)













= 0 , we get 𝑝1
ℎ = 𝑐 +
𝑡1𝐶1 − 𝑇 , 𝑝2
ℎ = 𝑐 + 𝑡2𝐶2 + 𝑇 , 𝑠1
ℎ = 𝐶1 , and 𝑠2
ℎ = 𝐶2 . When 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 , we have ?̅?𝑖










Proof of Proposition 1: 































































































Proof of Lemma 2: When 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 , we have 𝜋𝑛 =
[2(1+𝑏)𝑡−(1+𝑘)2](𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
[(2+𝑏)𝑡−𝑘−1]2
 , 𝜋𝑝 =
(𝑎−𝑐)2[2𝑡−(1+𝑘)2]𝑡
(2𝑡−1−𝑘)2
− 𝐶𝑝, 𝜋𝑠 =
[2(1+𝑏)𝑡−1](𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
[(2+𝑏)𝑡−1]2








− 𝐶𝑝 . When 𝑏 = 0 , then 𝜋𝑝 − 𝜋𝑛 =







 , so if 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑘 − 𝑘2 < 0 , then 
𝑑(𝜋𝑝−𝜋𝑛)
𝑑𝑘
< 0, namely, 𝜋𝑝 − 𝜋𝑛 is decreasing in 𝑘. Therefore, if 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑘 − 𝑘
2 < 0, 𝜋𝑝 < 𝜋𝑛. If 𝑏𝑡 −
𝑘 − 𝑘2 > 0 , then 
𝑑(𝜋𝑝−𝜋𝑛)
𝑑𝑘
> 0 , namely, 𝜋𝑝 − 𝜋𝑛  is increasing in 𝑏 . When 𝑏 → ∞ , we can get 
lim
𝑏→∞
(𝜋𝑝 − 𝜋𝑛) = 𝜋𝑝 > 0. Therefore, there must be 𝑏 = 𝑏
∗(𝑘) that makes 𝜋𝑝 = 𝜋𝑛.  




− 𝐶𝑠 . When 𝑘 = 0 , then 𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑛 = −𝐶𝑠 < 0 . 
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0 , namely, 𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑛 is decreasing in 𝑘 . Therefore, if −𝑏 + 2𝑘 + 𝑏𝑘 < 0 , 𝜋𝑠 < 𝜋𝑛 . If −𝑏 + 2𝑘 +
𝑏𝑘 > 0 , then 
𝑑(𝜋𝑠−𝜋𝑛)
𝑑𝑘
> 0 , namely, 𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑛  is increasing in 𝑘 . When 𝑘 → ∞ , we can get 
lim
𝑘→∞
(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑛) =
2(𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡2
2𝑡−1
− 𝑐𝑐1 = 𝜋𝑠 + (𝑎 − 𝑐)
2𝑡 > 0. Therefore, there must be 𝑘 = 𝑘∗(𝑏) making 
𝜋𝑠 = 𝜋𝑛.  




− 𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑝 . When 𝑘 = 0 , 𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑝 = −𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑝 < 0  since 𝐶ℎ >






> 0 , that is, 𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑝 is increasing in 𝑘 . When 
𝑘 → ∞, we can get lim
𝑘→∞
(𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑝) =
2𝑡2(𝑎−𝑐)2
2𝑡−1
− 𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑝 = 𝜋ℎ + 𝐶𝑝 +
𝑡(4𝑡−1)(𝑎−𝑐)2
2𝑡−1
> 0. Therefore, 
there must be a 𝑘 = 𝑘𝑠 that makes 𝜋ℎ = 𝜋𝑝.  




− 𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑠 . When 𝑏 = 0 , 𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑠 = −𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑠 < 0 since 𝐶ℎ >






> 0, that is, 𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑠 is increasing in 𝑏. When 𝑏 →
∞, we can get lim
𝑏→∞
(𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝑠) =
2(𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
2𝑡−1
− 𝐶ℎ + 𝐶𝑠 = 𝜋ℎ +
(𝑎−𝑐)2𝑡
2(2𝑡−1)
+ 𝐶𝑠 > 0. Therefore, there must be 
a 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑝 that makes 𝜋ℎ = 𝜋𝑠.  
 




















− (1 − 𝛽𝑝)𝐶𝑝 . When 𝑏 > 𝑏
∗(𝑘) , the necessary condition 



















































− (1 − 𝛽𝑠)𝐶𝑠 . When 𝑘 >
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− (1 − 𝛽ℎ)𝐶ℎ . When 𝑘 > 𝑘
𝑠  and 𝑏 > 𝑏𝑝 , the 
























Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 2, in the region {(𝑏, 𝑘)|0 < 𝑘 < 𝑘∗(𝑏) ∩ 0 < 𝑏 < 𝑏∗(𝑘)} 
where 0 < 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑝 and 0 < 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑠, we have 𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑝 and 𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠, thus, the competition mode is 
optimal. In the region {(𝑏, 𝑘)|0 < 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑠 ∩ 𝑏 > 𝑏∗(𝑘)} , we have 𝜋𝑝 < 𝜋𝑛 , thus, the pricing 
cooperation mode is optimal. In the region {(𝑏, 𝑘)|𝑘 > 𝑘∗(𝑏) ∩ 0 < 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑝}, we have 𝜋𝑠 < 𝜋𝑛, thus, 
the service cooperation mode is optimal. Finally, in the region {(𝑏, 𝑘)|𝑘 > 𝑘𝑠 ∩ 𝑏 > 𝑏𝑝} , we have 
𝜋ℎ > 𝜋𝑝 and 𝜋ℎ > 𝜋𝑠, high cooperation; that is, cooperation in both price and service cooperation is 
optimal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
From Table 2, we get 𝑝1
𝑛 − 𝑝2





𝑛 = 𝐴1 − 𝐴2 =
(𝑎−𝑐𝑚)(2+3𝑏)(1+𝑘)(𝑡2−𝑡1)
𝑀1𝑀2−𝑁1𝑁2
 . If 𝑡1 < 𝑡2 , then 𝑝1
𝑛 > 𝑝2
𝑛  and 𝑠1
𝑛 > 𝑠2
𝑛 ; If 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 , then 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑛  and 
𝑠1
𝑛 = 𝑠2




𝑛. Similarly, from Table 3, we get the same results in 

























, where 𝜉 ∈ {𝑛, 𝑠, 𝑝, ℎ}.  
